The `repricing’ of executive stock options

By Don M. Chance, Raman Kumar, R. Todd. 2000

195 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/373774d750134f91ac79c8e952092bd14d1c3ada

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Citations in the corpus

Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options (2000, unknown): “The third paper, Chance et al. (1997) examines resetting in more &normal' circumstances, and focusses on two issues: deriving a valuation model for options that may be reset, and examining the timing and incentive impact of resetting by comparing the performance of "rms prior and subsequent to the r”
Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies (2012, background): “…scheme for a given managerial position (e.g., Guay, 1999; and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006), the option-like character of 1 In addition, Chance, Kumar, and Todd (2000) find that managerial stock option exercise prices are frequently revised downwards after stock price declines but not…”
An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing (2001, background): “, 2000) or has focused only on poorly performing firms (Chance et al., 2000; Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2000).”
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad (2006, background): “The fact that executive stock option exercise prices are frequently revised downward after price declines but never, to our knowledge, upward to offset price increases suggests a similar asymmetry (see, e.g., Chance, Kumar, and Todd, 2000).”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, unknown): “Brenner et al. (2000) and Chance et al. (2000) provide evidence that re-pricings reflect governance problems (i.e., that entrenched managers are more likely to do repricings).”
An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan (2005, background): “Brenner et al. (2000) and Chance et al. (2000) argue that the possibility of repricing previously granted stock options can provide perverse incentives to managers.”
On the optimality of resetting executive stock options (2000, background): “Assume as in (7) that HL < 1 (an obvious comparison holds if HL 1).”
6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, result): “While some studies find that weak board governance is associated with higher pay levels (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999 ), overall, the accumulated research evidence is mixed on the effects of board governance on executive pay level, incentive alignment, and decisions to reprice underwater stock”