Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies

By Omesh Kini, Ryan Williams. 2012

453 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eae8d8151aa7d66e88307f1fa234655769980e21

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Skrålan Vergauwe
2. Lars Helge Haß
3. Maximilian A. Müller

In Finance

1. Skrålan Vergauwe
2. Lars Helge Haß
3. Maximilian A. Müller

Citations in the corpus

• Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “This is in line with labor economics (Bognanno, 2001) and other papers in the finance literature that study the effect of tournament incentives on performance (Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran, 2009) and risk-taking (Kini and Williams, 2012).”
• CEO Tenure and Earnings Management (2015, unknown): “The coefficient on Leverageit is significantly negative, suggesting that firms in financial distress tend to invest less in R&D and other discretionary expenses (Kini and Williams, 2012).”