On the optimality of resetting executive stock options

By V. Acharya, Kose John, Rangarajan K. Sundaram. 2000

168 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ca2a54cb3bcf7cb8c3b5130924003c254b8af0d

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In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

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Citations in the corpus

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs (2011, background): “This intuition is similar to that developed, for instance, in Acharya et al. (2000) about the impact of resetting executive options on ex ante incentives.”
CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts (2006, unknown): “, Saly (1994), Acharya et al. (2000), Carter and Lynch (2001, 2004), Chidambaram and Prabhala (2003)).”
The `repricing’ of executive stock options (2000, background): “Acharya et al. (2000) develop a theoretical model that argues that under some circumstances repricing can be optimal.”
Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, background): “Those theories point out that early vesting is sometimes desirable in Chaigneau (2009) and Peng and Roell (2009), it allows the CEO to reduce his risk by trading his stock for cash; in Brisley (2006) and Bhattacharyya and Cohn (2010), this risk reduction encourages the CEO to take e¢ cient risky pr”
Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts (2008, unknown): “These are captured in an elegant way in Acharya et al. (2000).”
Labor Laws and Innovation (2013, unknown): “References [1] Acharya, V.”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, unknown): “…and from large institutional investors such as the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, who argue that resetting is tantamount to rewarding management for poor performance and that, more importantly, it destroys incentives present in the initial contract (Acharya, John, and Sundaram, 2000, p. 66).”