Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options

By Menachem Brenner, Rangarajan K. Sundaram, David Yermack. 2000

241 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8d1299f6797215eb468852c6cbf4b478acd185c3

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Citations in the corpus

Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “…options expensing (Carter and Lynch (2003)), the ongoing debate over repricing or replacing underwater options (Achayra, John, and Sundaram (2000), Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000), Carter and Lynch (2001), Chen (2004), Chance, Kumar and Todd (2000), Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003), Coles,…”
An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing (2001, background): “However, prior research either has not attempted to use only control firms with out-of-the-money options (Brenner et al., 2000) or has focused only on poorly performing firms (Chance et al.”
The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans (2000, background): “(1997) and Brenner et al. (1999) assumes that "rms reprice the option only once.”
The Role of Power and Politics in the Repricing of Executive Options (2002, background): “, Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998) suggests that option repricing nonetheless represents a breakdown in tbe agency relationship between managers and stockholders (Brenner et al., 2000; Chance et al., 2000).”
An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan (2005, background): “Brenner et al. (2000) and Chance et al. (2000) argue that the possibility of repricing previously granted stock options can provide perverse incentives to managers.”
On the optimality of resetting executive stock options (2000, background): “T| L?t”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, unknown): “Brenner et al. (2000) present evidence that option grants and compensation are higher for managers whose options are re-priced, although this evidence is confounded by the fact that the re-pricing dummy variable in their regressions is endogenous.”
Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance (2009, background): “In addition, if their stock options end up deep out of the money, the executives can lobby to reset the strike price of existing options or issue additional at-the-money options (Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000)).”