An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing

By Mary Ellen Carter, Luann J. Lynch. 2001

149 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/506ec0635def2c38b5ae28e0e4bd097177a3d60e

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Citations in the corpus

6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, result): “While some studies find that weak board governance is associated with higher pay levels (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999 ), overall, the accumulated research evidence is mixed on the effects of board governance on executive pay level, incentive alignment, and decisions to reprice underwater stock”
Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123-R* (2009, unknown): “Following Carter and Lynch (2001) and Oyer (2004), we argue that firms that under-perform relative to their industry will find it harder to retain employees as such employees have attractive outside employment opportunities within the industry.”
Earnings Management around Employee Stock Option Reissues (2006, unknown): “10 Several papers examine the cross-sectional determinants of stock option repricing (see Carter and Lynch (2001), Chance, Kumar and Todd (2000), Chidambaran and Prabhala (2002)). Brenner, Sundaram and Yermack (2000) derives a model that values stock options with a repricing feature, and find that t”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “This concern is reinforced by the observation that rms reprice in response to poor rm-specic performance, not just in response to poor industry or market performance (Chance, Kumar, and Todd, 2000; Carter and Lynch, 2001).”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, unknown): “On the other hand, Carter and Lynch (2001a) point out that re-pricings are conditional on bad firm-specific performance and on the firm's (unobserved) decision not to terminate its employees.”
CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts (2006, unknown): “Several researchers have argued that option repricing might be optimal (e.g., Saly 1994; Acharya, John and Sundaram 2000; Carter and Lynch 2001 and 2004; and Chidambaram and Prabhala 2003).”
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation (2008, unknown): “We include the high-tech sector dummy because these firms arguably faced a tighter labor market, at least through 2000 (Carter and Lynch, 2001). This indicator variable is as defined in Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003). We include industry sales growth as a proxy for the demand for executive talent i”
Executive Pay, Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment (2008, background): “…common practices with such executive options, such as backdating (Yermack (1997), Heron and Lie (2006)) and implicit agreements to reprice options in the event of a fall in the stock price (Carter and Lynch (2001)), frequently make such options packages far more valuable than what is disclosed.”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “…the ongoing debate over repricing or replacing underwater options (Achayra, John, and Sundaram (2000), Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000), Carter and Lynch (2001), Chen (2004), Chance, Kumar and Todd (2000), Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2005b), Ferri (2005),…”