Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options

219 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “For example, Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) found that stock price volatility increased 1030 Journal of Management / December 2007 early option exercise (e.g., exercise prior to expiration), indicating risk aversion.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “First, riskaverse executives, seeking diversi cation and liquidity, exercise options earlier than proscribed by the value-maximizing exercise strategy (Carpenter, 1998; Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2005; Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace, 2010).”
Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk (2008, background): “Because CEOs hold stock options over long periods of time, both until the time the options vest and often after they become exercisable (Bettis et al. 2005), they often hold portfolios of options with substantial accumulated value.”
Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, background): “A number of researchers have examined the role of social-cognitive and institutional processes in CEO pay determination (Bettis et al., 2005; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Devers et al., 2007; O’Reilly and Main, 2007; Westphal et al., 2006).”