Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms

By James J. Chrisman, Jess H. Chua, Franz Willi Kellermanns, Erick P. C. Chang. 2007

450 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2bdb27bc1d454b085f560fde248b07f13e33dedb

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Accounting Research in Family Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges (2014, result): “Both agency and stewardship theory find empirical support in prior research (Chrisman et al., 2007; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007).”
Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms☆ (2011, background): “Chrisman et al. (2007) and Chrisman et al. (2004) suggest that family businesses tend to monitor and provide incentives to family managers, and thus their performance is better.”
Riding the waves of family firm internationalization: A systematic literature review, integrative framework, and research agenda (2020, unknown): “Both these theories focus on the concept of goal alignment but diverge in considering managers in FFs as agents or stewards (Chrisman et al., 2007), leading to conflicting predictions about the facilitating or hampering effect of family management on internationalization (Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011”
How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model (2011, unknown): “Empirical research on executive pay at family firms (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2007; Combs et al., 2010; GomezMejia et al., 2003; McConaughy, 2000; Miller, Block, & Jaskiewicz, 2010; Singal & Singal, 2010) should improve if the results of this model are used in further studies.”
Stewardship Theory: Realism, Relevance, and Family Firm Governance (2019, background): “Chrisman et al. (2012) imply that differences in double-agency problems in owner-managed family and nonfamily firms may be greater than differences in principal–agent or even principal–principal agency problems, which suggests situations where stewardship theory may be singularly important since rel”
Innovativeness in family firms: a family influence perspective (2010, background): “…a view, however, is in contrast to research that portrays family firms as prone to conflict (e.g., Kellermanns and Eddleston 2004; Levinson 1971) and agency costs (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2007; Schulze et al. 2001), problems that are not conducive to shared risk-taking and family firm performance.”
Turning Agents into Psychological Principals: Aligning Interests of Non‐Owners Through Psychological Ownership (2013, unknown): “Research suggests that monitoring through observation and constant evaluation, while being costly, can be an effective way of motivating agents to behave more like principals (Chrisman et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989).”
Family Control and Ownership Monitoring in Family-Controlled Firms in Japan (2010, unknown): “Whether family managers are agents or stewards has been the subject of several studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al., 2007), and evidence of agency problems in family firms is reported by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) and Schulze et al. (2001).”