Complementarity and Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts

By Nicholas Argyres, Janet E. L. Bercovitz, Kyle J. Mayer. Organ. Sci., 2007

375 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/03140a3f9d5c82f8dac160528b0e383e80af596d

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In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Does familiarity foster innovation? The impact of alliance partner repeatedness on breakthrough innovations (2015, positive): “Repeated dyadic interactions have been shown to promote trust (Gulati, 1995), facilitate contract re-negotiation (Argyres et al., 2007; Vanneste and Puranam, 2010), and develop firm-specific capabilities (Ethiraj et al.”
The Many Futures of Contracts (2014, background): “Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer (2007) note that as firms contract over time, they include more contingency planning.”
Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009, neutral): “and Zenger (2002), Mayer and Argyres (2004), and Argyres et al. (2007).”
Do country-level institutional frameworks and interfirm governance arrangements substitute or complement in international business relationships? (2012, background): “bilities of the exchange partners in a relationship (Argyres et al., 2007; Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Dekker, 2004; Macaulay, 1963; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Salbu, 1997).”
Drivers and Performance Outcomes of Trust in International Strategic Alliances: The Role of Organizational Complexity (2008, background): “There is considerable support among interorganizational exchange researchers and practitioners that trust is central to enduring, productive relational exchanges (Argyres et al. 2007, Inkpen and Currall 2004).”
Contracts, Extracontractual Incentives, and Ex Post Behavior in Franchise Channel Relationships (2012, background): “By specifying agent performance obligations in greater detail, complete contracts serve to reduce role ambiguity and the agent’s leeway to undertake noncompliant or opportunistic actions (Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer 2007).”
How to Design Franchise Contracts: The Role of Contractual Hazards and Experience (2012, positive): “We can therefore establish that the chain’s experience in franchising allows it to learn from past mistakes, so that matters (or contingencies) leading to unanticipated problems and not initially included in the contract can gradually be included in new contracts in order to avoid such problems in t”
Performance and completeness in repeated inter-firm relationships: the case of franchising (2010, background): “…that might 23 threaten the relationship; b) identify such contingencies with more accuracy and at lower cost; and c) become better at understanding how to efficiently adapt if such contingencies occur (Mayer and Argyres 2004; Ryall and Sampson 2006; Argyres et al. 2007; Argyres and Mayer 2007).”
Strategic alignment: A missing link in the relationship between strategic consensus and organizational performance (2013, methodology): “Consistent with prior research (e.g. Argyres et al., 2007), we used Stata 11.0 and the program IVENDOG (Baum et al., 2002) to calculate two-stage least squares regressions (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003).”