Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects

By Michael D. Ryall, Rachelle C. Sampson. Management Sciences, 2009

419 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3880f786e443abf048b53532afa15e30831ce336

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Citations in the corpus

Network-based Research in Entrepreneurship: A Decade in Review (2015, background): “Recognizing that firms also negotiate repeatedly with partners (Ryall and Sampson, 2009), we suggest that a further study of contract design to infer bargaining power and value capture can also be facilitated by integrating relational and structural constructs.”
The Many Futures of Contracts (2014, background): “…before (and arguably had high levels of trust and relational governance) to reduce the sections of the contract that dealt with coordination? gathering financial and task performance data is not easy, yet it is possible (Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall & Sampson, 2009; Tong et al., 2008).”
Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement (2013, background): “…by guest on 26 July 2018 industries as varied as oil drilling (Corts and Singh 2004), information technology widely defined (Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Ryall and Sampson 2009; Shi and Susarla 2010), dry cleaning (Gil and Hartmann 2011), taxicabs (Jackson and Schneider 2011), and movies (Gil 2011).”
Blockchain Governance—A New Way of Organizing Collaborations? (2020, positive): “As parties often opt to simultaneously use different governance mechanisms to organize their transactions (Poppo and Zenger 2002, Ryall and Sampson 2009), understanding the interplay among these mechanisms has both theoretical and practical relevance.”
Modes of Cooperative R&D Commercialization by Start-ups (2009, positive): “A more recent literature, however, argues and provides evidence for the opposite—the view that prior relations is associated with creating more detailed and customized contracts with more enforcement mechanisms (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Ryall and Sampson, 2009 ), suggesting ”
Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction cost economics – 25 years on: reflections in memory of Oliver Williamson (2021, background): “Trusting partners engage in more comprehensive ex ante contracting – consistent with enhanced information sharing where trust is a governance mechanism (Dyer and Chu, 2003) – incurring higher initial costs but reducing ex post costs (Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Zaheer et al., 1998).”
Competence- and Integrity-Based Trust in Interorganizational Relationships: Which Matters More? (2018, background): “Trust and complex contracts complement each other because trust leads parties to negotiate more complex contracts (Ryall & Sampson, 2009; Schepker et al., 2014).”