J. Marion

Economics and Econometrics · 2007–2013

A researcher in the Science corpus: 4 papers; trusts 18 researchers and is trusted by 5 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom J. Marion trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. E. Guerre
  2. I. Perrigne
  3. Tong Li
  4. Q. Vuong
  5. Wolfgang Karl Härdle
  6. Han Hong
  7. Roger B. Myerson
  8. Jonathan D. Levin
  9. Hayley H. Chouinard
  10. D. Marburger

Who trusts J. Marion overall

  1. Lynn H. Kaack
  2. W. Kopczuk
  3. Laurie Kaye Nijaki
  4. Hiroshi Ohashi

Papers from J. Marion's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers J. Marion trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
  2. Optimal Auction Design
  3. Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
  4. Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
  5. Gasoline Price Differences: Taxes, Pollution Regulations, Mergers, Market Power, and Market Conditions
  6. Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry
  7. Absenteeism and Undergraduate Exam Performance
  8. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
  9. Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (Management Sciences)
  10. Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements

Their papers