Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

By George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons, Kevin Murphy. 2002

1,846 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6537dee002819a296c0b7c722e3f661c7c54a38f

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In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Inventory Record Inaccuracy: An Empirical Analysis (2008, background): “This supports the proposition of Baker et al. (2002) that external suppliers have more incentive to invest in process quality than do retail-owned DCs.”
Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements (2002, background): “He further argues that some firms discourage the use of an elaborate contract because it ‘indicates a lack of trust and blunts the demands of friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horsetrade’ (Macaulay, 1963: 64).”
OM Forum - Distributed Ledgers and Operations: What Operations Management Researchers Should Know About Blockchain Technology (2020, background): “In economics and OM there are numerous studies of incomplete and relational contracts (Hart and Moore 1988, Baker et al. 2002, Taylor and Plambeck 2007).”
The Role of Service Level Agreements in Relational Management of Information Technology Outsourcing: An Empirical Study (2009, background): “In addition, well-crafted contracts promote longevity in exchanges by increasing the penalties that accompany severing an exchange relationship (Baker et al. 2002; Klein 1996).”
Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances (2006, neutral): “This stands in contrast to the assumptions in articles such as Klein and Leffler (1981), Kreps and Wilson (1982), Diamond (1984), and Baker et al. (2002), in which the history of each player's actions is readily observable to all agents in the model.”
Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships (2012, positive): “The typical example considers a regulated firm whose marginal costs are increasing in its type (à la Baron and Myerson, 1982), but its outside opportunities are decreasing in its type. In the model presented below, in contrast, only the outside option of the informed party is assumed to depend on th”
Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts (2010, background): “More precisely, whenever a ∈ N , then c(a) = c > 0 and b(a) > 0 and whenever a / ∈ N then c(a) = 0 and b(a) = 0.(6) The paper also allows each player i ∈ {1, 2} to condition her actions on a public randomization device.”
Make, buy, organize: The interplay between research, external knowledge, and firm structure† (2014, background): “Internal research helps rms identify, evaluate, and assimilate external knowledge (Rosenberg, 1979; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), which often comes via acquisitions (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Fleming, 2001).”