Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions

By E. Guerre, I. Perrigne, Q. Vuong. 2000

869 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7aac3536b6d6467e3e78bfc1228923929a839277

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Citations in the corpus

Bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction: A summary (2000, methodology): “The empirical speci"cation follows a two-stage approach similar to Elyakime et al. (1994) and Guerre et al. (1998) .”
Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions (2011, background): “Since in states in θ4k and θ5k bidder i actually obtains at most qk−1 or at least qk+1 respectively, perturbing qk will not result in any change in (conditional) expected utility in these states.”
Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions (2004, neutral): “developed by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) (hereafter GPV) and extended by Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002), Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) (together, LPV hereafter) and by Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) (hereafter HPP).”
Nonlinear Pricing with Product Customization in Mobile Service Industry (2011, positive): “We study its identiﬁcation in the spirit of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Perrigne and Vuong (2011a).”
Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values (2003, methodology): “1/15, h0f1 D cf1 n1n0LT 1/15, h0f0 D cf0 n1n0LT 1/15 for the second step, following Guerre et al. (2000) and Li et al. (2002).”
An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices (2006, background): “Recent non-parametric approaches such as Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Athey and Haile (2002) allow for greater flexibility in the assumptions governing the distribution of such valuations, which may also be of use in models such as the one estimated here.”
Deciding Between Competition and Collusion (2003, neutral): “[12] Guerre, E.”
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market (2010, methodology): “The arguments leading to the identification of bidder valuations from bid data build upon the idea propounded in Elyakime et al. (1994) and Guerre et al. (2000), but extend the applicability of these ideas to the strategically more complex setting of divisible good/multi-unit auctions.”
Simple and honest confidence intervals in nonparametric regression (2016, neutral): “As discussed in the main text, results from Low (1997), Cai and Low (2004) and Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) imply that it is impossible for such a CI to achieve coverage and near-optimality over F(M ; η) when M is unknown.”
Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions (2007, methodology): “While the estimation method employed here yields consistent estimates, as Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) note, the estimated distributionˆg (b|z) only converges at the rate (nL) 1/6 , where nL is the number of bid observations across all auctions.”