Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry

By Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo. 2000

633 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8f0dc07cfb16fc0ef4510847f229a38f7b8be229

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling (2004, background): “…wells) differ in some important observable ways, they are arguably considerably more homogenous than the projects examined in previous studies [e.g., software development projects (Banerjee and Du¯o, 2000), IT services outsourcing projects (Kalnins and Mayer, 2004), and alliances (Gulati, 1995)].”
How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York (2006, neutral): “Similar modern-day instances of informal contract enforcement appear in Ellickson (1989; 1993), McMillan and Woodruff (1999), Fafchamps (1996), Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000), and Clay (1997).”
Public procurement design: Lessons from the private sector (2012, background): “4 See Bartholomew (1998), Clough and Sears (1994), Hinze (1993) and Sweet (1994).”
Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by . . renting U.S. securities laws (2005, positive): “Banerjee and Duflo (2000) show, in turn, that positive reputation effects enable many Indian software firms to achieve more favorable and flexible A R TIC LE IN PR ES S J .”
Offshore information systems project success: the role of social embeddedness and cultural characteristics (2009, background): “…primarily by drawing on the IS outsourcing literature that has evaluated agencyrelated factors, including formal and psychological contracts, and project characteristics (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo 2000; Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Gopal et al. 2003; Koh et al. 2004; Nidumolu and Subramani 2003).”
Where do capabilities come from and how do they matter? A study in the software services industry (2005, neutral): “rial (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000).”
The Economics of Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings (2014, neutral): “…their business, including repaying debt (Diamond, 1989), fighting new entrants (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), not holding up suppliers (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000), meeting earnings targets (Fisher and Heinkel, 2008) and producing quality products (Cabral, 2000; Hörner, 2002).”
Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real Estate Markets (2004, neutral): “The empirical relevance of asymmetric information has been studied in the used car market [Genesove (1993) and Porter and Sattler (1999)], the labor market [Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor (1996) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997)], the insurance market [Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Finkelstein and P”
Strategic Fit in Industrial Alliances: An Empirical Test of Governance Value Analysis (2005, methodology): “This threeitem scale, which we adapted from the work of Bensaou and Anderson (1999), measures the upstream uncertainties arising from technological changes. Performance ambiguity (PERFAMB). This five-item scale, which we adapted from the work of Anderson (1985), measures the OEM’s inability to asses”