S. Tadelis

Economics and Econometrics · 1997–2020

A researcher in the Science corpus: 13 papers; trusts 61 researchers and is trusted by 47 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 46 citations into it; #1,829 of 23,481 by trust here, #1,607 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 44 citations into it; #1,126 of 11,946 by trust here, #932 by citations
• Marketing — 35 citations into it; #4,377 of 6,289 by trust here, #3,763 by citations
• Safety Research — 30 citations into it; #1,811 of 5,829 by trust here, #2,873 by citations
• Sociology and Political Science — 24 citations into it
• Accounting — 14 citations into it; #2,733 of 8,970 by trust here, #6,194 by citations
• Strategy and Management — 14 citations into it; #825 of 10,874 by trust here, #1,228 by citations
• Finance — 11 citations into it

Whom S. Tadelis trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Armin Falk
2. Gary E. Bolton
3. Pat Bajari
4. Pierpaolo Battigalli
5. Patrick Bajari
6. Tore Ellingsen
7. Elena Krasnokutskaya
8. Martin A. Dufwenberg
9. Urs Fischbacher
10. Axel Ockenfels

Who trusts S. Tadelis overall

1. O. Williamson
2. Caroline Flammer
3. Robert Gibbons
4. Silke J. Forbes
5. James Andreoni
6. Peter G. Klein
7. M. Warner
8. G. Bel
9. Jonathan D. Levin
10. Patrick Bajari

Papers from S. Tadelis's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers S. Tadelis trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. A theory of reciprocity (Games Econ. Behav.)
2. Economics and Identity
3. Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
4. ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
5. Guilt in Games
6. Dynamic psychological games (Journal of Economics Theory)
7. What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
8. The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
9. The asymptotic variance of semiparametric estimators
10. The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment

Their papers

• Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts (2001) — 1,210 citations
• Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies (2002) — 456 citations
• Consumer Heterogeneity and Paid Search Effectiveness: A Large Scale Field Experiment (2014) — 363 citations
• The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism (2002) — 236 citations
• The Power of Shame and the Rationality of Trust (2007) — 137 citations
• Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities (2010) — 473 citations
• Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision (2002) — 190 citations
• Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis (2006) — 154 citations
• Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) — 439 citations
• People Management Skills, Employee Attrition, and Manager Rewards: An Empirical Analysis (2020) — 138 citations
• Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs (2014) — 348 citations
• Public procurement design: Lessons from the private sector (2012) — 167 citations
• Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1997)