What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games

By Jason Dana, Daylian M. Cain, Robyn M. Dawes. 2006

697 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f8dfaee608ae97a13b528ccdd59495d3050d4f98

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Citations in the corpus

Anonymity in the Dictator Game Revisited (2012, background): “Other studies find that dictators prefer not to enter the game or to exit it, if receivers have no knowledge about participating in the experiment (Dana et al., 2006; Lazear et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007).”
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility (2010, background): “Dana et al. (2006) thus show that many people who would voluntarily share $10 with an anonymous other in a dictator game prefer to just take $9 for themselves and not face that choice.”
Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness (2007, background): “Importantly, this pattern is quite similar to that found in other recent experiments measuring social preferences under the possibility of moral wiggling (cf. Dana et al. 2006; Lazear et al. 2006).”
Empathy: a motivated account. (2014, background): “In a clever extension of this phenomenon to game theory, Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) asked participants to play a dictator game in which individuals unilaterally decided how to split money between themselves and another person.”
Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward) (2011, positive): “Dana et al (2006) show a significant portion of subjects would prefer to take $9 than have their decision from a $10 dictator game implemented.”
Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt (2007, background): “This option offers people the possibility of avoiding the interaction situation altogether without the would-be interaction partner ever knowing about the possibility of interacting (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006 ).”
Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior (2008, background): “recipient ( Dana et al., 2006; Andreoni & Bernheim, 2007), the division becomes more”
Self-signaling and social-signaling in giving (2015, background): “While much social-signaling behavior can be explained and predicted by a rational signaling model with ayesian inference, a successful self-signaling strategy, such as the exploitation of ‘moral wiggle-room’ a la Dana et al. (2007), eems to manifest primarily through information acquisition choices ”
Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right? (2008, result): “This is consistent with a recent study by Dana et al. (2006) that found that 30% of the subjects preferred a $9 outside option rather than playing a $10 dictator game as the allocator (if they chose the outside option the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played).”
Do Women Behave More Reciprocally than Men? Gender Differences in Real Effort Dictator Games (2012, neutral): “This is due to the fact that female dictators in Windfall take a larger amount from 10e recipients compared to 5e recipients.(12) Male dictators do not show di erent magnitudes of reciprocity.”