Guilt in Games

By Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin A. Dufwenberg. 2007

717 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Safety Research, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/58f4b4e917d2126816296eb6ebc1a2bdab019c6a

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Citations in the corpus

Preference Elicitation under Oath (2010, neutral): “Second, an alternative explanation is guilt aversion, which is experienced by one who fails to meet the expectations of others (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007).”
WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS (2008, background): “An alternative explanation for promise keeping is based on the theory of guilt aversion (Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)).”
Preferences for Truth‐Telling (2016, methodology): “We use the framework of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) in our analysis.12 Of course, the audience cannot directly observe whether a player is lying, and has to base their beliefs on the observable report r. Because the audience player makes correct Bayesian inference based on observing the report ”
Dynamic psychological games (2009, background): “No ‘pure’ SE exists, 30 just like in Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger’s theory (cf. 6.4 below).”
Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion (2013, background): “This so-called guilt aversion results in a psychological game (as in Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007, 2009), as preferences depend on beliefs about the payoff actually expected by the other person—the so-called ‘second-order expectations’.”
Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences (2019, background): “…share because they feel shame, guilt, or social pressure to conform to a request (Milgram 1963; Kandel and Lazear 1992; Bernheim 1994; Tadelis 2008; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007; Charness and 2 According to the 2009 Economic Report of the President (Box 9-1), 72 percent of Americans were…”
Bare promises: An experiment (2010, background): “Regarding the trustworthiness-enhancing effect of bare promises, there is an increase in the Roll rate of 16.6 percentage points; this difference is marginally significant on a one-tailed test.”
Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility (2008, neutral): “…in line with economic models in which decisions are not only governed by preferences over outcomes but also by the desire to avoid cognitive dissonance or guilt, or to maintain a positive self-image (Konow, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2002; Prelec and Bodner, 2003; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007).”
Conscience Accounting: Emotional Dynamics and Social Behavior (2012, neutral): “Here, 33% (5) of the Senders who told the truth chose to donate, compared to 57% (13) of those who lied—a weakly significant difference (Z=1.”
MORAL CLEANSING AND MORAL LICENSES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE (2013, background): “…(Fehr and Fischbauer 2003) and a series of papers have dealt with more self-centred arguments such as identity, guilt-aversion or warm-glow, that describe the benefits of being moral (see Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007; Aguiar et al. 2010).”
Testing guilt aversion (2010, background): “2 In the guilt aversion model, people care about what others expect of them, feeling guilty if their behavior falls short of expectations; see Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) for an intuitive account and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005, 2007) for formalities.”
Is mistrust self-fulfilling? (2009, neutral): “ An interesting question, however, is whether your expectation (if manifested) can affect the likelihood that your trust is repaid.”
Great expectations: neural computations underlying the use of social norms in decision-making. (2011, result): “To demonstrate the importance of considering expectations in the UG, we compared a novel expectation model, which incorporates expectations to the standard inequity-aversion model, which posits that people are motivated to minimize the difference between their payoffs.”
The framing of games and the psychology of play (2011, positive): “Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) develop general theory; our specification is similar to their notion of " simple guilt " 9 : Let b ij denote i's 'first-order belief' about j's choice (i, j = 1, 2, 3; i = j); b ij is the mean of a probability distribution i has over A j .”