Dynamic psychological games

By Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin A. Dufwenberg. Journal of Economics Theory, 2009

543 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4c0eaace89dd61d10ca976312a8784d2d65f6cb1

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Citations in the corpus

A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition (2012, unknown): “(12)In a single agent set-up, Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) also use a reference point equal to expected material utility given the chosen action.”
Other Regarding Preferences: A Selective Survey of Experimental Results (2012, methodology): “Drawing on psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009), Rabin’s model gives a central role to beliefs.”
Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion (2013, background): “This so-called guilt aversion results in a psychological game (as in Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007, 2009), as preferences depend on beliefs about the payoff actually expected by the other person—the so-called ‘second-order expectations’.”
The framing of games and the psychology of play (2011, unknown): “Thus we need to move from standard games to socalled psychological games, as introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and further developed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009).”
Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans (2009, background): “Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) for multi-player games, and our definition of OCP is theoretically very similar to the solutions concepts they propose.”
Guilt in Games (2007, background): “This framework—originally developed by John Geanakoplos, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti (1989) and recently extended by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) (henceforth B&D)—allows players’ utilities to depend on beliefs (about choices, states of nature, 17 * Battigalli: Bocconi University, Via…”
Testing guilt aversion (2010, background): “Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) notes that a person who trusts despite an attractive outside option reveals optimistic expectations, and will be correspondingly disappointed if the trustee fails to reward the trusting action.”
NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL: Norms Make Preferences Social (2015, background): “…Rabin (2002); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004); Falk and Fischbacher (2006); Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007); Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008); Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009). an outcome, when in reality, “[the] rules that guide fair behavior are not located in an individual’s private…”
Conscience Accounting: Emotional Dynamics and Social Behavior (2012, unknown): “Our first key finding in this section is that in the Incentive treatment, when the donation option came as surprise directly after the message choice, 30% (6) of the participants who told the truth chose to donate, compared to 73% (27) of those who lied (Z=3.”
Great expectations: neural computations underlying the use of social norms in decision-making. (2011, methodology): “The expectation model (Smith, 2009) was developed in the context of Psychological Game Theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) which describes a mathematical framework in which beliefs can be modeled in the utility function.”
Disguising Lies—Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games (2019, methodology): “11For our game, the de ned equilibrium is equivalent to sequential equilibrium for psychological games developed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009).”