Richard S. Steinberg

Management Science and Operations Research · 2005

A researcher in the Science corpus: 1 paper; trusts 3 researchers and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Management Science and Operations Research — 25 citations into it
• Marketing — 20 citations into it
• Economics and Econometrics — 15 citations into it

Whom Richard S. Steinberg trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Lawrence M. Ausubel

Papers from Richard S. Steinberg's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Richard S. Steinberg trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
2. Optimal Auction Design
3. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination (Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems)
4. Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
5. A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (Management Sciences)
6. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
7. Intertemporal Price Discrimination
8. Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling (Games Econ. Behav.)
9. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
10. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

Their papers

• Combinatorial Auctions (2005) — 662 citations