Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination

By Arne Andersson, Mattias Tenhunen, Fredrik Ygge. Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, 2000

308 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dcc07d68c107984dc9009e466b6866c96069113a

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. Noam Nisan
2. Yoav Shoham
3. Kevin Leyton-Brown
4. Daniel J. Lehmann
5. John O. Ledyard
6. Eugene Nudelman
7. Ahuva Mu'alem
8. Aranyak Mehta

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Kevin Leyton-Brown
2. Yoav Shoham
3. Noam Nisan
4. Frank Hutter
5. Eugene Nudelman
6. Daniel J. Lehmann
7. Holger H. Hoos
8. Michael P. Wellman

In Marketing

1. Kevin Leyton-Brown
2. Noam Nisan
3. Yoav Shoham
4. Eugene Nudelman
5. Frank Hutter
6. Daniel J. Lehmann
7. Michael P. Wellman
8. John O. Ledyard

Citations in the corpus

• Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “Andersson et al. (2000) made insightful computational comparisons between some of the search algorithms (namely the CASS and Sandholm’s algorithm) and standard MIP techniques used in commercial solvers (CPLEX 6.5). Although it has not taken the most recent developments into account, their study conc”
• Combinatorial Auction-Based Allocation of Virtual Machine Instances in Clouds (2010, background): “[4] proposed an integer programming based solution to the winner determination problem.”
• Learning the Empirical Hardness of Optimization Problems: The Case of Combinatorial Auctions (2002, background): “Subsequent research has exposed a variety of problems with these legacy distributions: see, for example, [2, 4, 15].”
• Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms (2000, background): “[L1] Sandholm: Uniform, .xed random with low fixed =0, hi fixed =1 [L1a] Andersson et al.: Uniform, .xed random with low fixed =0, hi fixed = 1000 [L2] Sandholm: Uniform, linearly random with low linearly =0, hi linearly =1 [L2a] Andersson et al.: Uniform, linearly random with low linearly = 500,”
• Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (2000, methodology): “In fact, two recent papers [4, 27] have used commercial Integer Programming software for combinatorial auctions and have reported good results for various distributions.”
• The Winner Determination Problem (2003, background): “Andersson et al. (2000) have investigated how well such solvers scale.”
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005, methodology): “Others have found promising algorithms (Sandholm et al. 2001), and Andersson et al. (2000) have shown that CPLEX software is fairly effective in solving the winner determination problem in combinatorial auction simulations.”
• Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling (2001, background): “Typical formulations of the mechanism's computational problem are NP-Complete, but may admit heuristic search procedures e ective in practice in certain environments [1, 10, 31].”