Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions

By Noam Nisan. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2000

598 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/27d8f8f78002f4c7b3c442fda46f2f112adab874

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Marketing

Citations in the corpus

Learning the Empirical Hardness of Optimization Problems: The Case of Combinatorial Auctions (2002, background): “Other influential algorithmic work on the general WDP is [18, 8].”
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008, background): “Much work has recently been done on these topics, see e.g., (Vohra & de Vries 2000; Sandholm et al. 2001; Nisan 2000; Lehmann, O’Callaghan, & Shoham 1999) and many references therein.”
Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination (2000, methodology): “We observe that the winner determination problem can be expressed as a standard mixed integer programming problem, cf. [Nisan, 1999; Wurman, 1999], and we show that this enables the management of very general problems by use of standard algorithms and commercially available software.”
Combinatorial auction design (2003, background): “In fact, Nisan and Segal (2002) analyze the communication complexity of eliciting subset valuations, and solving (and even approximating) the winner determination problem.”
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms (2000, background): “In the absence of test suites, some suggested novel bid generation techniques, parameterized by number of bids and goods [24, 10, 4, 8]. (Other researchers have used one or more of these distributions, e.g., [17], while still others have refrained from testing their algorithms altogether, e.g., [ 16”
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2001, background): “Theorem: Denote by CF the class of complement-free valuations; SM the class of valuations with decreasing marginal utilities (submodular valuations); GS the class of valuations that satisfy the gross substitutes property; XOS the class of XOR-of-OR-of-singleton valuations; OXS the class of OR-of-”
Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “As far as we know, (Nisan, 2000) is the first successful effort to systematically analyze a bidding language.”
Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective (2003, background): “Nisan introduced three basic types of bids— (a) atomic bids, in which a bundle of items is treated as a single bid; (b) OR bids, which are sets of atomic bids in which the bidder will serve any number of disjoint atomic bids for the sum of their respective prices; and (c) XOR bids, in which the bidd”
Algorithmic Game Theory (2012, unknown): “Bidding languages were studied in a general and formal way in [Nis00] on which Section 1.”
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (2003, background): “A discussion of various ways in which bids can be restricted and their consequences can be found in Nisan (1999). In that paper Nisan asks, given a language for expressing bids, what preferences over subsets of objects can be correctly represented by the language.”
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005, background): “20 Parkes (1999) and Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) are recent examples that allow this more expressive bidding language.”