Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling

By Michael P. Wellman, William E. Walsh, Peter R. Wurman, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. Games Econ. Behav., 2001

512 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/480493524667782dd8c24c349a462adbe2bb0afd

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Tycoon: An implementation of a distributed, market-based resource allocation system (2004, unknown): “ a user’s jobs. Examples the economic approach are Spawn (by Waldspurger, et al. [31]), work by Stoica, et al. [26]., the Millennium resource allocator (by Chun, et al. [10]), work by Wellman, et al. [33], and Bellagio (by AuYoung, et al. [5]). Spawn and the work by Wellman, et al. uses a reservatio”
Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001, unknown): “A related subfield of Distributed AI, sometimes termed market-based computation ([32], [3] and [31]), aims to leverage the notions of free markets in order to solve distributed problems.”
Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “, 2002), job shop scheduling (Wellman et al., 2001), electricity markets (Ausubel and Cramton, 2004; ?), trading (Abrache et al.”
Economics and Electronic Commerce: Survey and Directions for Research (2001, background): “The AuctionBot project at the University of Michigan is also concerned with the design and testing of auction agents [387, 388, 401–403].”
Incentive-based modeling and inference of attacker intent, objectives, and strategies (2003, background): “sign theory [30, 5, 12] can be very valuable in solving a variety of Internet computing problems such as routing, packet scheduling, and web caching [9, 32, 27].”
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms (2000, background): “For example, researchers have considered auctions for the right to use railroad tracks [5], real estate [19], pollution rights [13], airport time slot allocation [21] and distributed scheduling of machine time [26].”
A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms (2004, methodology): “It is also common for markets to operate as open systems ( Wellman , 2004), allowing any agent to take part so long as it respects the system’s speciﬁed rules and interface .”
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search (2000, background): “Furthermore, as nontrivial multiagent systems become more prevalent, researchers are looking to market protocols such as auctions as the basis for the coordination of agent activities or for resource allocation [5] [18].”
Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents (2004, background): “For single-machine problems in which each agent holds exactly one job, and each job requires one time slot, Wellman et al. (2001) analyze several auction protocols, and for each of them they consider how far from the equilibrium the prices are obtained.”
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (2000, background): “Such prices for individual items are certainly desirable and it is known that for some combinatorial auctions they exist [28, 29, 5] and in other cases they cannot be de ned in any reasonable manner [16, 13, 28, 29].”
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (2003, background): “21 It is proved in Krishna and Perry (1997) (see also Williams (1999) for the same result under slightly different assumptions) that (in the model described) the optimal auction that is also efficient is what is sometimes known as as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme.”