Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
General Decision Sciences · 2010–2013
A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 9 researchers and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- General Decision Sciences — 24 citations into it
- Cognitive Neuroscience — 18 citations into it
- Artificial Intelligence — 14 citations into it
- Developmental and Educational Psychology — 13 citations into it
- Experimental and Cognitive Psychology — 12 citations into it
- Social Psychology — 10 citations into it
- Cognitive Science & Psychology — 8 citations into it
- History and Philosophy of Science — 5 citations into it
Whom Jonathan St. B. T. Evans trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Jonathan Evans
- Matthew D. Lieberman
- K. Stanovich
- Daniel Kahneman
- Gerd Gigerenzer
- Amos Tversky
- R. F. West
- Peter Carruthers
- J. Baron
- Wim De Neys
Who trusts Jonathan St. B. T. Evans overall
- Jonathan Evans
- K. Stanovich
- E. P. Shulman
- M. Toplak
- Simon Calmar Andersen
- Minsu Ha
- L. Antony
- R. F. West
- Ashley R. Smith
Papers from Jonathan St. B. T. Evans's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Jonathan St. B. T. Evans trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning
- The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. (Psychology Review)
- Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness
- Reflexive and reflective judgment processes: A social cognitive neuroscience approach.
- Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems
- Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
- The Principles of Psychology
- The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin
- Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?-Open Peer Commentary-Gone with the wind: Individual differences in heuristics and biases undermine the implication of
- The Intentional Stance
Their papers
- Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition (2013) — 854 citations
- Thinking Twice: Two minds in one brain (2010) — 119 citations