On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning
By Jonathan Evans. 2007
347 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2bc46f55adf2d2e582dd4333fcdfa641cf2385a2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- K. Stanovich
- Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
- Jonathan Evans
- Wim De Neys
- Liane Gabora
- Paul T. Sowden
- Andrew Pringle
- A. Glöckner
In General Decision Sciences
- Jonathan Evans
- Wim De Neys
- Cilia Witteman
- A. Glöckner
- K. Stanovich
- Valerie A. Thompson
- Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
- Ron Sun
In Safety Research
- Wim De Neys
- Cilia Witteman
- A. Glöckner
- K. Stanovich
- Jonathan Evans
- Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
- Valerie A. Thompson
- Andrea Ahlgrimm
Citations in the corpus
- Incubation, insight, and creative problem solving: a unified theory and a connectionist model. (2010, background): “Processing hard (explicit) and soft (implicit) constraints simultaneously can result in different inferences, which can lead to a ‘conflict’ (Evans, 2007; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).”
- Reflective liberals and intuitive conservatives: A look at the Cognitive Reflection Test and ideology (2015, neutral): “…there is some debate as to whether intuition and reflection operate sequentially—i.e. where intuition is automatic and then regulated through reflection (Evans, 2003, 2007)—or in parallel with individuals differing in the degree to which intuition versus reflection are activated in the first place…”
- Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty (2010, neutral): “According to the default interventionist model, higher ability individuals are more likely to engage analytic processes (Evans, 2007).”
- Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning (2012, background): “Even within type theories there is a clear architectural division between those accounts that I describe as “default-interventionist” and “parallel-competitive” (Evans, 2007b ).”
- The shifting sands of creative thinking: Connections to dual-process theory (2014, background): “In addition, shifting between these processes may be more effectively applied by creative individuals over the course of a creative task (Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Vartanian, Martindale, & Kwiatkowski, 2003).”
- Two minds, three ways: dual system and dual process models in consumer psychology (2012, background): “A small body of research has emerged in response to default-interventionist (Evans 2007, 2008) conceptions of dual processing in heuristics and biases.”
- Belief in Fake News is Associated with Delusionality, Dogmatism, Religious Fundamentalism, and Reduced Analytic Thinking (2019, neutral): “Analytic reasoning may sometimes override efault responses suggested by intuitive processes, which are hought to emerge autonomously from simple stimulus-response airings (Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).”
- The effortless nature of conflict detection during thinking (2009, background): “Evans ( 2006 , 2007a , 2007b ) has recently argued that analytic processes can be responsible for cognitive biases as much as heuristic processes.”
- How distinct are intuition and deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-induced decision modes (2009, background): “One suggestion of categorizing dual-process models into three classes according to the interplay of the two decision modes was made by Evans (2007).”
- Belief bias in informal reasoning (2012, result): “This explanation is consistent with the default-interventionist formulation of dual process theory, in which the Type 1 output is accepted unless something occurs to trigger Type 2 thinking (Evans, 2006 ).”