The Intentional Stance
By S. Brison. 1989
Subfields: Philosophy
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Philosophy
- Jonathan Evans
- K. Stanovich
- Peter Carruthers
- Keith Frankish
- Tania Lombrozo
- R. F. West
- Josh Tenenbaum
- Peter Fonagy
Citations in the corpus
- Alignment of Language Agents (2021, methodology): “In modeling the system as a CID, the modeler adopts the intentional stance towards the agent (Dennett, 1989), which means it’s not important whether the agent’s primary objective has an obvious physical correlate, as long as treating the system as an agent optimizing for that primary objective is a ”
- Machine Theory of Mind (2018, background): “The goal of the mental state net is to mentalise about the presented agent during the current episode (i.e. infer its mental state; Dennett, 1973; Frith & Frith, 2006), by pars-”
- PowerTransformer: Unsupervised Controllable Revision for Biased Language Correction (2020, methodology): “In this work, we use the positive, neutral, and negative agency dimensions, where agency is defined as the capacity to intentionally make changes or act upon one’s environment (Dennett, 1989).”
- Explainable Agents and Robots: Results from a Systematic Literature Review (2019, background): “This tendency to anthropomorphize objects is known as the “intentional stance” [23].”
- The Folk Concept of Intentionality (1997, background): “Whether or not intentionality is truly an objective attribute of the mind, people certainly ascribe intentions to each other (Dennett, 1987; Heider, 1958; Shultz & Wells, 1985).”
- Design and Evaluation of Explainable BDI Agents (2010, background): “Humans explain and understand their behavior in terms of its underlying desires, goals, beliefs, intentions and the like [4, 11, 14].”
- Observational learning and the raiding of food caches in ravens, Corvus corax: is it 'tactical' deception? (2002, background): “In addition to learning, ravens may fine-tune their specific interactions by knowing what others see or intend (second-order intentionality, Dennett 1987; theory of mind, Premack & Woodruff 1978).”
- Objective Robustness in Deep Reinforcement Learning (2021, background): “In this paper, we understood it more informally as equivalent to a goal or objective under the intentional stance [10] because humans already intuitively understand and reason about the intentions of other systems through this lens and because formally specifying a behavioral definition of…”
- Narrative Planning: Balancing Plot and Character (2010, background): “Specifically, characters must be perceived by the audience to be intentional agents (Dennett, 1989).”
- Goal Inference as Inverse Planning (2007, background): “How is this feat of induction possible? A possible solution, proposed by several philosophers and psychologists, is that these inferences are enabled by an intuitive theory of agency that embodies the principle of rationality: the assumption that rational agents tend to achieve their desires as opti”
- On the Theoretical Role of "Genetic Coding" (2000, background): “The same has been claimed about our habit of using semantic properties to discuss natural computing devices (brains) as well (Dennett 1987).”
- Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. (1995, result): “In fact, we wish to argue that the results of the present habituation study provide independent empirical support for the general conjecture that by the end of the first year infants are indeed capable of taking the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987) in interpreting the goaldirected behavior of rati”
- Toward sociable robots (2003, background): “Our social-emotional intelligence is a useful and powerful means for understanding the behavior of, and for interacting with, some of the most complex entities in our world—people and other living creatures [12].”
- Everett and structure (2001, background): “When plans etc. Dennett himself would embrace such claims (see Dennett (1987) for an extensive discussion), and they are at least suggested by the functionalist program in philosophy of mind which I discuss in section 7.”
- Social learning and social cognition: The case for pedagogy (2006, background): “He can take the 'design stance' (Dennett, 1987) and look for the”
- Grasping the Intentions of Others: The Perceived Intentionality of an Action Influences Activity in the Superior Temporal Sulcus during Social Perception (2004, unknown): “In Dennett’s (1987) framework: A non-goal-directed”