Giuseppe Lopomo

Management Science and Operations Research · 2002

A researcher in the Science corpus: 1 paper; trusts 3 researchers and is trusted by 1 researcher here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Management Science and Operations Research — 5 citations into it; #10,999 of 11,946 by trust here, #10,392 by citations

Whom Giuseppe Lopomo trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. V. Krishna

Who trusts Giuseppe Lopomo overall

1. Peter Cramton

Papers from Giuseppe Lopomo's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Giuseppe Lopomo trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Optimal Auction Design
2. Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
3. A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
4. Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
5. Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
6. Authority and Communication in Organizations
7. Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
8. Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
9. Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
10. Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments (American Political Science Review)

Their papers

• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002) — 142 citations