Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments

By V. Krishna. American Political Science Review, 2001

237 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies. When committees are homogeneous, the situation is different. All equilibria are inefficient regardless of legislative rules, but the closed rule leads to greater informational efficiency than does the open rule. Furthermore, the efficiency gains under the closed rule more than offset distributional losses regardless of the degree of preference divergence. We also examine the incentives provided by the different rules for information acquisition and committee specialization.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

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Citations in the corpus

Spatial Models of Delegation (2004, result): “This finding differs sharply from the conclusions in Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989 and from those in Krishna and Morgan 2001. premises of risk aversion or unidimensionality, whose importance has been overestimated.8 We then consider model A′′, which additionally assumes risk-averse decision makers.”
Authority and Communication in Organizations (2002, background): “The proof foryo ≤ L − 3b follows directly from the proof of proposition 8 in Krishna and Morgan (2000).40 While Krishna and Morgan do not consider the case whereyo ≥ L − 3b, one can easily verify that as long asyo < L − 2b, their equilibrium still exists and is Pareto-dominant.”
Information Aggregation in Polls (2008, background): “…uniform-quadratic " case, which is widely used in applications (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krehbiel 1990; Grossman and Helpman 2001; and Krishna and Morgan 2001a, b): 11 Following Dessein (2002), it is straightforward to generalize the quadratic speci…cation as follows: If one lets…”
Contracting for Information Under Imperfect Commitment (2004, background): “( ) which assigns for every m a probability distribution over the states : It is required that following any message m; the principal maximizes her expected utility given her beliefs; G is derived from using Bayes rule wherever possible; is optimal given Y .6 In what follows, an equilibrium is…”