Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

By Sandro Brusco, Giuseppe Lopomo. 2002

142 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc7e4db2de664b9653b033a12300f21ce876cd3e

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Citations in the corpus

• Simultaneous Ascending Auctions (2004, background): “Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and Brusco and Lopomo (2002) show that for an auction format like the FCC's, where the bidding occurs in rounds and bidding can be done on distinct units, that there exist equilibria where bidders coordinate a division of the available units at low prices…”