Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products

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Recent developments in the theory of regulation (2007, background): “Baumol and Klevorick (1970) and Bailey and Coleman (1971), among others, analyze the e¤ects of regulatory lag on incentives for cost reduction under rate-of-return regulation. Pint (1992) examines the e¤ects of regulatory lag under price cap regulation and demonstrates the importance of basing proje”
Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002, background): “The reason is that if a bidder has won one object then the value of the other object is at least 13Menicucci [33] has characterized revenue maximizing auctions in an extension of Armstrong’s model which allows for complemetarities in the buyers’ utility functions.”
Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions (2007, unknown): “Given m routes, there are 2m possible allocations of the contracts between bidder i and his opponents.”
Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement (2007, background): “Armstrong (2000) and Avery and Hendershott (2000) derive properties of the optimal multi unit auction when types are multidimensional.”