Optimal Multi-Object Auctions

By Mark Armstrong. 2000

206 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Management Science and Operations Research, Visual Arts and Performing Arts

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d7708008f888fdae6d0bd48887db3e4545ddd18a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

1. Sandro Brusco
2. Giuseppe Lopomo
3. Estelle Cantillon
4. Simon Board
5. Veronika Grimm
6. John Asker

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Sandro Brusco
2. Giuseppe Lopomo
3. Estelle Cantillon
4. Simon Board
5. John O. Ledyard
6. Veronika Grimm
7. John Asker
8. Patrick Bajari

In Visual Arts and Performing Arts

1. Sandro Brusco
2. Giuseppe Lopomo
3. Estelle Cantillon
4. Simon Board
5. Veronika Grimm
6. John Asker

Citations in the corpus

• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002, background): “Helpful comments were made by the participants to the October 1998 Midwestern Theory Conference, the VIWorld Congress of the Econometric Society and to seminars held at the University of California-San Diego, University College London, the European University Institute, INSEAD, University of…”
• Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions (2007, unknown): “…allowing bidders to convey information about their costs for the combinations of contracts, in addition to their costs for the individual contracts, is a necessary condition for e¢ ciency (Groves, 1973, Clarke, 1971) and for optimality (Levin, 1997, Armstrong, 2000 and Avery and Hendershott, 2000).”
• Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement (2007, background): “ Armstrong (2000) and Avery and Hendershott (2000) derive properties of the optimal multi unit auction when types are multidimensional.”
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005, background): “26 Cybernomics (2000) reports on experiments in which a package bidding extension for the SMR was tested that did not use prices, but provided eligibility benefits for certain bids.”
• Procurement When Price and Quality Matter (2010, background): “Much of the recent work in multidimensional screening has tended to focus on discrete type spaces (Armstrong, 2000; Avery and Henderschott, 2000; Malakhov and Vohra, 2004).”
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect (2009, background): “10 Chakraborty (1999) and Armstrong (2000) consider an intermediate case where valuations in states z and z′ are correlated.”