Amelia C. Regan
2003
A researcher in the Science corpus: 1 paper; trusts 1 researcher and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Whom Amelia C. Regan trusts
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Noam Nisan (in Management Science and Operations Research)
Papers from Amelia C. Regan's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Amelia C. Regan trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
- Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (INFORMS journal on computing)
- A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (Management Sciences)
- Optimal Auction Design
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
- Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination (Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems)
- Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling (Games Econ. Behav.)
- The Package Assignment Model (Journal of Economics Theory)
- Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
Their papers
- Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective (2003) — 165 citations