Branislav L. Slantchev
Sociology and Political Science · 2003–2007
A researcher in the Science corpus: 6 papers; trusts 10 researchers and is trusted by 28 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Sociology and Political Science — 12 citations into it; #1,756 of 22,756 by trust here, #7,579 by citations
- Economics and Econometrics — 11 citations into it; #2,843 of 23,481 by trust here, #8,485 by citations
- Political Science and International Relations — 11 citations into it; #708 of 4,701 by trust here, #1,757 by citations
- Development — 6 citations into it
- Management Science and Operations Research — 5 citations into it; #1,213 of 11,946 by trust here, #2,957 by citations
Whom Branislav L. Slantchev trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Robert Powell
- Kenneth A. Schultz
- Anne E. Sartori
- Dan Reiter
- William Reed
- Vincent P. Crawford
- Joel Sobel
- Jeffrey S. Banks
- Edward D. Mansfield
- John C. Harsanyi
Who trusts Branislav L. Slantchev overall
- Robert Powell
- S. Wolford
- Bahar Levento
- Dan Reiter
- Alastair Smith
- William Reed
- Mark Fey
- Adam Meirowitz
- Matthew A. Baum
- Todd S Sechser
Papers from Branislav L. Slantchev's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Branislav L. Slantchev trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
- The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States (American Political Science Review)
- The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information (American Political Science Review)
- STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
- How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace
- BARGAINING THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
- Exploring the Bargaining Model of War (Perspectives on Politics)
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition (International Organization)
- Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements (International Organization)
Their papers
- The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations (2003) — 340 citations
- The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States (2003) — 226 citations
- How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace (2004) — 212 citations
- Military Coercion in Interstate Crises (2005) — 176 citations
- Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs (2006) — 173 citations
- The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War (2007) — 140 citations