The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information

By Robert Powell. American Political Science Review, 2004

259 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9a1d08d579ac683b73fde4ed8e75bb9316f8c254

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Citations in the corpus

Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict (2010, methodology): “The model draws heavily on the work of Fearon (1995) and Powell (2004), Powell (2006)), which shows that sudden shifts in expected power between conflicting parties can lead to a breakdown of bargaining.”
Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference (2008, methodology): “Fearon (2004) provides a model of such a process in the context of civil war and Powell (2004) offers a more general characterization of this problem.”
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia (2013, methodology): “Paramilitary entry corresponded to a sharp intensification in overall casualties, as these groups intentionally targeted civilians perceived to be allied with the guerrillas (Restrepo et al., 2004).”
The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War (2007, background): “To understand why wars begin, we have to knowwhy they end—the termination of war must in-volve the resolution of its causes (Blainey 1988, x).”
Bargaining and the Nature of War (2004, background): “For example, Powell (2004a) and Lewis and Schultz (2003) show that subtle changes in the bargaining protocol or equilibrium-solution concept drastically alter the equilibrium behavior we expect to observe.”
Saving Human Lives: What Complexity Science and Information Systems can Contribute (2014, unknown): “, arms races [89], long-standing territorial rivalries [90], or large and rapid shifts in power [91, 92]) rely on indicators that are coarse in time (typically yearly), and therefore tend to miss the crucial steps of the escalation of tensions and the timing of the conflict outbreak [11, 93–95].”
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises (2005, background): “Hence, the model does not speak to the inefficiency puzzle with complete information (Fearon 1995; Powell 2004).”
Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk (2008, unknown): “This need not hold Powell 1999), leader bias (see Jackson and Morelli 2007), and commitment problems (as in Powell 2004 or Yared 2009).”
A Model of Ethnic Conflict (2011, background): “5In particular, the question of why a “Coase theorem” may not be valid for conflictual situations is an important one; see, e.g. Fearon (1995), Slantchev (2003) and Powell (2004).”
Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium (2004, unknown): “These in turn are as- Previous papers on conflict (see for instance Garfinkel, 1990; Grossman, 1991; Skaperdas, 1992; Hirshleifer, 1995; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001b; Powell, 2004) have studied a variety of problems we do not deal with.”