The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations

By Branislav L. Slantchev. American Political Science Review, 2003

340 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/58d42ee6dd66642abf58cb20804756ec7f02688e

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Citations in the corpus

Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power (2010, background): “…relative power and resolve have converged, so long as the target believes it is still transmitting information about its cost-tolerance to a third party+ See Slantchev 2003 for a nice discussion of this “convergence principle” as a condition for war termination+ 75+ This was a central effect…”
Information, Power, and War (2003, background): “For an important paper critical of this result, see Slantchev 2003. had seized Port Arthur and limited Japanese occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula.”
Information, Commitment, and War (2011, methodology): “When war is the result of asymmetric information over relative bargaining power, fighting serves to reveal information and usually ends short of a fight to the finish when uncertainty is resolved (Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2004a; Slantchev 2003; Smith and Stam 2004; Wagner 2000).”
Bargaining and the Nature of War (2004, background): “…conflict as part of the bargaining process rather than the end of the bargaining process (Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Morrow 1997; Powell 2004a, 2004b; Slantchev 2002, 2003, forthcoming; 783 AUTHORS’ NOTE: The appendix with the proofs is available at http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/ jcrdata.htm.”
Economic Shocks and Civil War (2009, neutral): “See, for instance, Fearon (1995), Powell (1996, 1999 and 2004) and Slantchev (2003).”
How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace (2004, neutral): “However, the difference is not overwhelming.”
War as a Commitment Problem (2004, background): “…its payoff to fighting, the earlier it settles+ These offers therefore screen 2 according to its willingness to settle+ For analyses of these dynamics, see Powell 2004a; and Slantchev 2003b and 2004a+ 18+ Quoted in Parker 1993, 268+ Also see Aster 1973, 328; Weinberg 1980, 654+ 19+ Even if Britain…”
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game-Free Analysis of International Conflict (2011, background): “One central finding of this theoretical literature is that informational differences regarding aspects of the bargaining process play a key role in determining bargaining and war behavior (Fearon 1995, Schultz 1998, Powell 1999, Wagner 2000, Powell 2004, Slantchev 2003, Smith & Stam 2006).”