The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition

By Kenneth A. Schultz, Barry R. Weingast. International Organization, 2003

288 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b748db6016490682ba2d75b2ce2c98d21c26e7c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

1. Stephan Haggard
2. G. Biglaiser
3. Michael Tomz
4. Mark L. J. Wright
5. Candace C. Archer
6. Branislav L. Slantchev
7. Karl Derouen
8. Andrew MacIntyre

In Finance

1. G. Biglaiser
2. Stephan Haggard
3. Michael Tomz
4. Mark L. J. Wright
5. Candace C. Archer
6. Branislav L. Slantchev
7. Karl Derouen
8. Andrew MacIntyre

In Strategy and Management

1. Michael Tomz
2. Candace C. Archer
3. G. Biglaiser
4. Branislav L. Slantchev
5. Stephan Haggard
6. Mark L. J. Wright
7. Karl Derouen
8. Andrew MacIntyre

Citations in the corpus

• Sovereign Bonds and the “Democratic Advantage”: Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World? (2007, methodology): “…was used and data were collected from a Bloomberg International terminal beginning in November 2004+ 49+ See Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003; and Schultz and Weingast 2003+ 50+ See Huntington 1968; and Oneal 1994+ 51+ Marshall and Jaggers 2002+ 52+ See Block and Vaaler 2004; and Vaaler and…”
• The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We? (2011, background): “Root (1994), North and Weingast (1989) and Schultz and Weingast (2003) show that these institutional changes affected both the state’s capacity to borrow and private investment.”
• Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default (2013, background): “Schultz and Weingast (2003) offer historical examples of democracies that could borrow more money, on better terms, than autocracies.”
• Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage (2012, background): “…argued that constitutions that limit executive discretion enhance the credibility of a country’s sovereign debt+1 Schultz and Weingast drew the logical conclusion that a “democratic advantage” should exist in debt financing: because they place more limits on their executives, democracies’…”
• Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs (2006, background): “For example, audience cost arguments have been used to build theories about debt repayment (Schultz and Weingast 2003), peaceful conflict resolution (Lipson 2003:chapter 1), alliance reliability (Gaubatz 1996), economic sanctions (Dorussen and Mo 2001), trade agreement compliance (Mansfield,…”
• Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage”? (2005, background): “Along these lines, Schultz and Weingast (2003) argue that “representative institutions enhance a state’s borrowing power.””
• The Rule of Law and Economic Development (2008, methodology): “Yet among the most influential statements in this vein are a succession of papers by Weingast, which we use as a touchstone for our discussion (North & Weingast 1989; Weingast 1995, 1997; Schultz & Weingast 2003).”