Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

By Jeffrey S. Banks, Joel Sobel. 1987

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Citations in the corpus

Discovering Diverse Multi-Agent Strategic Behavior via Reward Randomization (2021, background): “…selection) (Selten, 1965; 1975; Myerson, 1978), which aims to ﬁnd a subset of equilibria satisfying desirable properties, e.g., admissibility (Banks & Sobel, 1987), subgame perfection (Selten, 1965), Pareto efﬁciency (Bernheim et al., 1987) or robustness against opponent’s deviation from…”
Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital (2012, background): “…the interval of incomes is closed or open from the right. implies that he would be believed to have the higher income ( | )−∆ We consider the following variant of the intuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps, 1987, Banks and Sobel, 1987, and Grossman and Perry, 1986, and the references therein).”
Selecting Cheap‐Talk Equilibria (2008, methodology): “Standard equilibrium refinements based on Kohlberg and Mertens’s (1986) strategic stability—even those, like Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987), that have been especially designed for signaling games—have no power to refine equilibria in cheap-talk games.”
The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia (2014, methodology): “…Online Appendix I show that this equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion, formalized by Cho and Kreps (1987), and is the only pooling PBE that satisfies the Divinity Criterion of Banks and Sobel (1987).14 Naturally, there is another type of pooling PBE symmetrical with the one just described.”
Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines (2008, methodology): “The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the d1 criterion (Jeffrey Banks and Joel Sobel 1987; In-Koo Cho and David Kreps 1987).”
Pandering to Persuade (2013, methodology): “G.1 Preliminaries The refinement we use is the D1 criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987); some other criteria based on strategic stability such as universal divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987) would yield the same conclusion.”
Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons (2011, unknown): “For this reason, belief monotonicity is intimately related to the Divinity refinement of Banks and Sobel (1987).”
Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, background): “However, since signaling games typically have too many sequential equilibria, Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Kreps (1987), and several subsequent papers proposed equilibrium refinements that eliminate multiplicity.”
Financial System Architecture and the Co-Evolution of Banks and Capital Markets (2010, unknown): ““One-way complementarity” arises from the fact that the presence of banks permits some borrowers to access the market, just as insurance intermediaries facilitate individual market participation in Allen and Gale (2000).”
Self-signaling and social-signaling in giving (2015, background): “This efinement, akin to D1 (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Banks and Sobel, 1987), eliminates pooling equilibria based upon unreasonable eliefs and is used by Bernheim (1994) and Dufwenberg and Lundholm (2001).”
Blockchain Adoption for Combating Deceptive Counterfeits (2018, methodology): “We use the Divinity Criteria (D1) proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987) to reﬁne the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.”
An Economic Analysis of “Acting White” (2005, background): “The solution concept, much-used for analyzing costly signaling games, is the D1 re…nement of sequential equilibrium [Banks and Sobel, 1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and Sobel 1990], suitably extended to cover our two-audience setting.”