Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
By Dan Reiter. Perspectives on Politics, 2003
342 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f6f4f629792c070f050d28e30e84d5770e1735f1
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Political Science and International Relations
- Anna K Jarstad
- Branislav L. Slantchev
- Desirée Nilsson
- William Reed
- Bear F. Braumoeller
- Anne E. Sartori
- Isak Svensson
- Paul K. Huth
In Sociology and Political Science
- William Reed
- Anna K Jarstad
- Branislav L. Slantchev
- Desirée Nilsson
- Bear F. Braumoeller
- Robert Powell
- Anne E. Sartori
- Isak Svensson
Citations in the corpus
- The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations (2003, result): “As Reiter (2003) points out, this contradicts the earlier interpretation which treated fighting as detrimental to bargaining because of the expectation that the winning side inevitably expands its demands (Wittman 1979).”
- From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords (2008, background): “Our argument follows the line of reasoning underpinning bargaining models and the literature on costly signaling (e.g., Fearon, 1992, 1995; Kydd, 2000; Reiter, 2003).”
- Information, Power, and War (2003, background): “3. For a summary and review of bargaining theory as it has been applied to world politics see Reiter, 2003 .”