Bargaining and Learning While Fighting

By Robert Powell. 2004

343 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/36bd10840fd5ed90ef02b6c7cd285b40fade92dc

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Branislav L. Slantchev
2. Joan Esteban
3. Debraj Ray
4. P. Sullivan
5. Dan Reiter
6. Robert Powell
7. Clifford J. Carrubba
8. S. Wolford

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Branislav L. Slantchev
2. P. Sullivan
3. Bahar Levento
4. Dan Reiter
5. Clifford J. Carrubba
6. S. Wolford
7. Anne E. Sartori
8. Adam Meirowitz

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Branislav L. Slantchev
2. Dan Reiter
3. Debraj Ray
4. Clifford J. Carrubba
5. S. Wolford
6. Joan Esteban
7. P. Sullivan
8. Bahar Levento

Citations in the corpus

• Information, Commitment, and War (2011, methodology): “When war is the result of asymmetric information over relative bargaining power, fighting serves to reveal information and usually ends short of a fight to the finish when uncertainty is resolved (Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2004a; Slantchev 2003; Smith and Stam 2004; Wagner 2000).”
• Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War (2008, background): “10Most formal studies treat war as a costly lottery, with each state’s probability of winning and thus its expected utility reflecting the distribution of power (Powell 2004; Wagner 2000).”
• The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War (2007, background): “Although usually couched in terms of preventive war (a rising challenger cannot promise to deliver future benefits to a declining state in quantity sufficient to offset the latter’s gain from waging war while still relatively strong), the mechanism is much more general (Powell 2004).”
• War Aims and War Outcomes (2007, methodology): “I begin with a simple model of war initiation and termination grounded in recent work that sees war as a bargaining process (Fearon 1995; Filson & Werner 2002; Goemans 2000; Powell 2004; Slantchev 2003; Smith & Stam 2005; Stam 1996; Wagner 2000; Werner 1998).”
• War as a Commitment Problem (2004, background): “0@10~1 d!# 0+ In effect, fighting becomes costless and the bargaining surplus vanishes as the discount factor goes to one+ Because the surplus disappears, the states’ relative bargaining power, which affects who gets how much of the surplus, is of no consequence+ Suppose, however, that the costs of ”
• Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict (2007, background): “5 Alternative notions of polarization not based on the identity/alienation framework have been proposed by Wang and Tsui (2000), Reynal-Querol (2002c), and Zhang and Kanbur (2001).”