N. M. Fehr

Management Science and Operations Research · 2002–2004

A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 3 researchers and is trusted by 1 researcher here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom N. M. Fehr trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. Natalia Fabra
  2. Ilan Kremer
  3. Paul Klemperer

Who trusts N. M. Fehr overall

  1. Talat S. Genc

Papers from N. M. Fehr's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers N. M. Fehr trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
  2. Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory
  3. Architecture of Power Markets
  4. Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels
  5. Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond
  6. Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market
  7. An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry
  8. Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000
  9. An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market
  10. Hypothesis testing when a nuisance parameter is present only under the alternative: Linear model case

Their papers