An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market

By F. Wolak. 2000

375 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91283ad245b234de27511c335fba94d79dc072f4

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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

In Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Citations in the corpus

Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets (2014, positive): “Financial contracts are not observed, but they have been found to be a crucial factor in determining the optimal bids of the agents (Wolak, 2000; Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008).”
Quantifying the supply-side benefits from forward contracting in wholesale electricity markets (2007, positive): “As shown in Wolak (2000), a supplier’s fixed-price forward financial contract obligations alter its expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior, and through the market-clearing mechanism, the supplier’s expected profitmaximizing pattern of electricity production throughout the day.”
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market (2010, neutral): “However, an important issue that I have completely side-stepped when constructing the policy counterfactuals is 28See Wolak (1999), Wolfram (1998) for analyses of strategic bidding in electricity markets.”
Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion (2010, positive): “…transmission expansion from the market-power structure of generators, and takes into account the conjectures of each generator regarding other generators’ marginal costs due to the expansion (Sheffrin and Wolak, 2001, Wolak, 2000, and California ISO and London Economics International, 2003).”
Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market (2002, methodology): “14 See Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro (1998)”
Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market (2007, background): “I conclude in Section 7 by discussing general implications for (1)Other empirical papers that address competition in deregulated electricity markets includeWolfram [1998], Wolak [2000], and Wolak [2001].”
Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market (2005, neutral): “…of the sample, contradicting the predictions of the models that assume individual profit maximizing behavior among contracted firms (Newbery, 1998; Wolak, 2000). by different price levels, whether the effects of the trigger variables are statistically significant, and whether the signs of these…”
Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets (2005, background): “1 Wolak (2000) finds a significant impact of contracts on the performance of the Australian market.”
Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage (2008, neutral): “25 Moreover, theoretical and empirical analysis of restructured wholesale electricity markets indicates that the extent of forward contracting by suppliers has been an important determinant of equilibrium outcomes in restructured electricity markets (Bushnell et al., 2005; Chen and Hobbs, 2005; Wola”
Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets (2008, background): “In the context of the Australian electricity market, Wolak (2000) examines firm bidding behavior for supplying electricity given long-term contracts.”
Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets (2014, positive): “Within a structural framework that is commonly used in the electricity auctions literature (see Wolak (2000) and Hortaçsu and Puller (2008), among others), we first test if firms’ behavior is consistent with full internalization of permit prices.”