Designing Electricity Auctions

By Natalia Fabra, N. M. Fehr, David Harbord. 2004

336 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8fabe9c9dbb72225f54f9d3e206d766700299776

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Alexander Westkamp
2. Steen Koekebakker
3. Scott Duke Kominers
4. John William Hatfield
5. Alexandru Nichifor
6. Michael Ostrovsky
7. Fred Espen Benth
8. Talat S. Genc

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

1. Fred Espen Benth
2. Steen Koekebakker
3. Talat S. Genc
4. Nina Lange
5. Rafal Weron

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Alexander Westkamp
2. Scott Duke Kominers
3. John William Hatfield
4. Alexandru Nichifor
5. Michael Ostrovsky
6. Steen Koekebakker
7. Fred Espen Benth
8. Talat S. Genc

Citations in the corpus

• Stochastic modeling of financial electricity contracts (2008, background): “Designing electricity auctions have been studied by a number og authors (see for instance [18] and references therein).”
• Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks (2013, background): “Another extensive literature has studied competitive equilibria in exchange economies with indivisibilities leading to high-profile applications in spectrum auctions (McMillan, 1994) and electricity markets (Wolfram, 1998; Fabra et al., 2006).”
• Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium (2009, methodology): “Let (1) p , (0) p be prices at times 1 and 0, respectively.”