Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market

By S. Borenstein, James Bushnell, F. Wolak. 2002

956 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8aaffbeb6ebca95ee3c6ba37be6e92dd85383d1f

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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

Citations in the corpus

The value of supply security The cost of power interruptions: Economic input for damage reduction and investment in networks (2007, background): “For an elaborate discussion of the electricity market during the Californian crisis in 2000 and 2001, see Borestein et al. (2002). Transfers occur only in the case of supply shortages.”
Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector (2012, background): “Accordingly, market power studies typically found more exercise of market power in peak hours (see Müsgens 2006 for Germany, Borenstein et al. 2002 for the US). unilateral market power is also very large when capacity is scarce.”
Impacts of the German Support for Renewable Energy on Electricity Prices, Emissions, and Firms (2009, result): “Similar results have been found by Borenstein et al. (2002), and Joskow and Kahn (2002) who applied competitive benchmark methods for the Californian electricity market in the year 2000.”
Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In Residential Dynamic Electricity Pricing (2012, neutral): “Even setting aside infrastructure issues, 4 See Borenstein (2002) and Borenstein et al. (2002). recent experience has made it clear that at least some consumer groups will object specifically to implementation of dynamic pricing.5 Probably the most common objection to implementation of a dynamic…”
Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency: Evidence from U.S. Nuclear Power (2012, background): “Both academics and regulators have devoted considerable attention to identifying and mitigating market power in deregulated wholesale markets (see, e.g., Wolfram 1999, Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak 2002, and Joskow and Kahn, 2002).”
Decentralized charging control for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles (2010, background): “We note that non-cooperative game theory is widely used to study the supply side of electricity markets, especially in the context of imperfect competition (see, for example, [18]–[21]).”
When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation (2015, positive): “The perils of liberalized electricity markets have received significant scrutiny in the wake of the California electricity crisis (Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak 2002; Borenstein 2002; Bushnell, Mansur, and Savaria 2008; Mansur 2001, 2008), and adjustments have been made 6 Borenstein, Bushnell,…”
Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Empirical Work* (2012, neutral): “…electricity is not storable and has extremely inelastic demand might lead to sharp price increases in periods of high demand (for a review of the literature on price hikes and an empirical analysis of their sources in California during the summer of 2000, see Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002).”
Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000 (2004, positive): “In particular, this approach estimates which unit is marginal based on marginal costs and assumptions about competitive unit availability in a similar way to Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002).”
A FIRST LOOK AT THE EMPIRICAL RELATION BETWEEN SPOT AND FUTURES ELECTRICITY PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES (2003, background): “Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Borenstein et al. (2002) find that California electricity markets have some potential for market power.”
Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000 (2003, result): “Severin Borenstein et al. (2002) (hereafter BBW) report quantitatively similar results across these three years for their market-level measures of the amount market power exercised in the Cal-”
Coupon-Based Demand Response Considering Wind Power Uncertainty: A Strategic Bidding Model for Load Serving Entities (2016, background): “In Cases 3 and 4, ENR versus coupon price continuously increases in the range of [1], [10] $/MWh, while ENR versus coupon price in Cases 2 and 5 increases and then decreases.”
An empirical examination of restructured electricity prices (2005, background): “However, we do note in the analysis below, a shift in the statistical properties of California prices in May of 2000, which is consistent with the increase in market power found by Borenstein et al. (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002) and Kim and Knittel (2003).”