An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry

By S. Borenstein, James Bushnell. 2003

605 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0d4666e8ecc195babcf0c5c8cb7c08d069df3244

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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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Citations in the corpus

Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets (2005, background): “Oligopoly simulations in Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) as well as Bushnell (2004) show that the California market would have been much more competitive with even a modest adoption of real-time pricing by end-users.”
The Demand Elasticity Impacts on the Strategic Bidding Behavior of the Electricity Producers (2007, methodology): “Borenstein and Bushnell [4] simulated the California electricity market after deregulation with reference to a Cournot model by varying elasticities from and , pretending to cover most current estimates of short-run and long-run price elasticity.”
PWP-078 Linear Supply Function Equilibrium: Generalizations, Application, and Limitations (2000, background): “For the US, see Borenstein and Bushnell (1999).”
Theory and Application of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets (2004, background): “For the US, see Borenstein and Bushnell (1999).”
Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage (2008, neutral): “11 See, for example: Bergman and Andersson, 1995; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999; Cardell et al, 1997; Chen and Hobbs, 2005; Bushnell et al. 2008 ; Demailly and Quirion, 2006; Puller, 2007; Willems, 2007.”
Will Cross-Ownership Re-Establish Market Power in the Nordic Power Market? (2002, background): “For a discussion of the role of quantity decisions on power markets, see Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel (1999). participating in various forms of co-operation may be complex and case-specific.”
Optimizing demand-side bids in day-ahead electricity markets (2006, background): “, [7]), comparatively little attention has been paid to the effect of strategic demand bidding on market outcomes.”
An Empirical Study of Applied Game Theory: Transmission Constrained Cournot Behavior (2002, background): “Stoft [9] considered both two buses with two generators and three buses with two generators and one load.”
Modeling Strategic Electricity Storage: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany (2011, neutral): “Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) perform a Cournot analysis for the Californian market, assuming three Cournot competitors and a competitive Fringe.”
The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster (2002, methodology): “Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) simulated the market using a Cournot quantity-setting model.”
Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market (2005, background): “The studies have identified strategic bidding and output decisions by individual firms (Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Wolak (2000), Wolak (2003) and Wolfram (1998)) and have measured the departures of market outcomes from the competitive benchmark (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), Joskow and”
Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000 (2004, positive): “Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) use a Cournot model to analyse market power in the California electricity market under different market structures.”