Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

By S. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson. 2003

132 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8076d23240cf1847b281eb544fe51bc77ea82086

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

1. Talat S. Genc
2. Erin T. Mansur
3. Natalia Fabra
4. S. Holland
5. James Bushnell
6. S. Borenstein
7. Hunt Allcott

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Talat S. Genc
2. N. M. Fehr
3. David Harbord
4. S. Holland
5. Natalia Fabra
6. Erin T. Mansur

Citations in the corpus

• Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium (2009, background): “9 for the discriminatory auction ( 1)( ( ) ( / )) ( ) (1 ) disc n p Q z Q n p Q n Q − − ′ = − (3),”
• Designing Electricity Auctions (2004, background): “Wolfram (1999), for instance, argues in favor of uniform auctions for electricity, and Rassenti, Smith and Wilson (2003) cite experimental evidence which suggests that discriminatory auctions may reduce volatility (i.e. price spikes), but at the expense of higher average prices.”
• The Short-Run Effects of Time-Varying Prices in Competitive Electricity Markets (2006, methodology): “This has been supported by simulations, Bushnell (2005), and experiments, Rassenti et al .”