Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory

By Natalia Fabra. 2003

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8dffd9e39272b1d815c21f08c7f87eec77b1337a

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Citations in the corpus

Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market (2005, background): “2 In a model applicable to electricity markets, Fabra (2003) shows that the sustainability of collusion is easier in uniform-price auctions as compared to discriminatory auctions. competition in electricity markets (see Green and Newbery, 1992; von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993), as they predict a…”
Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000 (2004, unknown): “For example, Fabra (2003) suggests that electricity markets using discriminatory price auctions, like NETA, may be less susceptible to collusion than uniform price auctions, like the Pool.”
Why Did British Electricity Prices Fall after 1998 (2003, background): “Fabra (2002), however, shows in a theoretical model that a discriminatory auction is less vulnerable to the exercise of market power than a uniform-price auction is.”
Auction Design for Selling CO 2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2007, background): “It is wellunderstood that some information, if provided to the bidders during the auction, can (and probably will) be used by bidders to implement tacit collusive strategies (Avery 1998; Binmore and Klemperer 2002; Klemperer 2002; Fabra 2003; Dechenaux and Kovenock 2005; Abbink, Brandts et al. 2006)”
Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market (2007, unknown): “See Klemperer [2000] and Fabra [2003].”
Designing Electricity Auctions (2004, methodology): “2In a theoretical model similar to that used in this paper, Fabra (2003) shows that tacit collusion is easier to sustain in uniform auctions than in discriminatory auctions.”
Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium (2009, background): “In (4) a firm’s equilibrium supply function is indexed by the initial price, (0) ( , ] uni p c p ∈ , and (4) does not violate the capacity constraints.”