Architecture of Power Markets
By R. Wilson. 2002
168 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4b5d5ce406d8e52992525352b2de2a079ae404c
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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- James Bushnell
- Erin T. Mansur
- Natalia Fabra
- Thomas Morstyn
- Malcolm Duncan McCulloch
- Celeste Saravia
- Alexander Teytelboym
- Vernon L. Smith
Citations in the corpus
- Transmission of prices and price volatility in Australian electricity spot markets: A multivariate GARCH analysis: Discussion Paper No 114 (2002, unknown): “…transmission and distribution network providers and traders, currently supply electricity to 7.7 million customers with more than $8 billion of energy traded annually [for details of the NEM’s regulatory background, institutions and operations see NEMMCO (2001, 2002), ACCC (2000) and IEA (2001)].”
- Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics (2003, background): “(Wilson, 2002, p. 1332).”
- Pricing energy and ancillary services in integrated market systems by an optimal power flow (2004, background): “A thorough evaluation of unbundled and integrated market systems is given in [ 2 ].”
- Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “…for California market see http://www.caiso.com, retrieved on 10/16/2008), and other aspects of matching markets and their links to game theory and more specifically to auction and matching theory see Milgrom (2000, 2004, 2007), Klemperer (2004), Wilson (2002), and Roth (2002, 2008b), respectively.”
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002, unknown): “(See Wilson (2002) for an account of the most detailed design work.)”
- Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets (2008, background): “Wilson (2002) discusses the many physical problems inherent in the design of electricity markets including the necessity of balancing supply and demand instantaneously and the difficulties that transmission congestion offers to the problem.”
- Multiclass Energy Management for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Driven by Prosumer Preferences (2019, background): “Instead, they have signed a contract with a retail supplier, and the supplier buys energy from the wholesale market on their behalf [2].”
- Bilateral Contract Networks for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading (2019, background): “In liberalised electricity markets, large-scale generators, suppliers and industrial consumers can trade energy in wholesale markets organised by the transmission system operator (TSO) [4].”
- A Comparison of Buyer-Determined and Price-Based Multiattribute Mechanisms (2007, background): “Electricity reserve supply auctions (Bushnell and Oren 1994, Wilson 2002), highway construction works in the United States (Herbsman et al. 1995), and Department of Defense contracts (Fox 1974, Che 1993) all use such formats.”
- Designing Electricity Auctions (2004, background): “7See Wolak and Patrick (1997) and Wilson (2002) on this.”