Incentive Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover

By Tod Perry. 2000

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc85737c773b19b8e2a631597c7fba3cea09e572

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Citations in the corpus

Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders* (2006, background): “652 the journal of law and economics boards of directors varies with factors such as board size, composition, and director compensation.”
Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring (2004, background): “Perry (2000) finds a positive relation between CEO turnover following poor firm performance and”
What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading (2010, background): “This approach also allows us to compare executives and independent directors within the same firm, through the use of firm fixed effects.”
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (2004, unknown): “Perry (2000) breaks down the cross-sectional relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance by whether the outside directors are paid using incentives.”
Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation (2005, methodology): “Perry (1999) finds a positive relation between CEO turnover and the use of incentive-based compensation for directors.”
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, background): “Recent theoretical and empirical literature shows that independent director effectiveness in monitoring and advising depends on the cost of becoming informed (Raheja (2005); Adams and Ferreira (2007); Harris and Raviv”
Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors (2002, unknown): “…3.1), loss of the board seat if the company performs poorly (section 3.2), obtaining directorships in other companies if the firm performs well (section 3.3), and the possibility of an independent director shifting to grey status via the receipt of special payments or other benefits (section 3.4).”
The Match between CEO and Firm (2003, background): “The finance literature on CEO turnover, however, focuses primarily on monitoring mechanisms of the CEO, including the role of the board of directors (BODs) and blockholders in dismissing poorly performing CEOs, and on the quality of the CEO (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Yermack 1996; Perry 2000).”
Does founding family control affect earnings management? (2009, methodology): “For examples, research has been conducted on the impact of boards on CEO turnover (Weisbach, 1988; Perry, 2000), on earnings management (Xie et al., 2002) and on executive compensation (Hallock, 1997; Core et al., 1999).”