What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading

By Enrichetta Ravina, Paola Sapienza. 2010

451 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c272f757068eacf3ef210256ee5e5d61f1fef5f6

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading (2016, unknown): “Since total dollar profits are confounded by size and individual wealth effects, we focus on the measures based on abnormal returns as in previous studies (Ravina and Sapienza, 2010; Jagolinzer et al., 2011).”
Inside the “black box” of private in-house meetings (2018, unknown): “Using the method of Ravina and Sapienza (2010), we include an interaction term between trading value and an indicator variable for participating insiders (versus nonparticipating insiders) in the models of Table 6 Panel B.”
Forced Board Changes: Evidence from Norway (2011, unknown): “Indeed, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that both outside and inside directors earn abnormal profits when trading in their companies’ stocks, but inside directors earn better returns than outside directors.”
Commitment to Social Good and Insider Trading (2014, unknown): “A potential concern of measuring insider trading profits with post-trade price movements is that these movements may in part reflect the market's perception of the trades themselves, not necessarily insiders' superior information (e.g., Ravina and Sapienza, 2010).”
Asymmetric Information and Corporate Social Responsibility (2016, background): “…such as legislative amendments, the position of the insider within the firm, firm size, and institutional ownership (Betzer & Theissen, 2009; Brochet, 2010; Chung, Elder, & Kim, 2010; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Karpoff, 1986; Ravina & Sapienza, 2010; Rozeff & Zaman, 1988).”
The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (2012, background): “For example, Ravina and Sapienza (2008) compare the insider trading profits from corporate executives and independent directors, and find that trades initiated by independent directors are less profitable than those of the executives.13 Motivated by this argument, in Table 4, we break up rolodex…”
The Governance Effect of the Media's News Dissemination Role: Evidence from Insider Trading (2015, unknown): “Moreover, the ability to exercise discretionary trading in the future is valuable to insiders because it allows them to sell for consumption (Roulstone [2003]) and rebalance their personal portfolio for hedging purposes (Ofek and Yermack [2000]).”
National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, unknown): “In such systems, information disclosure is more effective meaning that outside directors can get information not only from external market intermediary, but also from institutionalized internal sharing (Ravina & Sapienza, 2009).”
Opportunism as a Firm and Managerial Trait: Predicting Insider Trading Profits and Misconduct (2017, background): “Moreover, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) document that insider profits are higher at firms with weak governance.”
Does a Board Characteristic Moderate the Relationship between CSR Practices and Financial Performance? Evidence from European ESG Firms (2021, methodology): “This measure has been employed by several authors, Cornett et al. (2008), Ravina and Sapienza (2009), Leng and Ding (2011), Sun et al. (2012), Hunziker (2013), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Akbas et al. (2016).”