Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers

By Lixiong Guo, Ronald W. Masulis. 2015

303 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9a6885104d924c3fe6022895aa0b36ca46ad3b59

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Citations in the corpus

• Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “11 Examples include: Hartzell and Starks (2003), Aggarwal et al.”
• Female directors, board committees and firm performance (2018, unknown): “We focus on these three committees because they are consistently present across all firms, and cover the three core functions of the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Guo and Masulis, 2015).”
• CEOs Under Fire: The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation (2013, unknown): “See Guo and Masulis (2012).”
• Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy (2015, methodology): “Following Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), we consider board size, fraction of independent directors, CEO-chairman duality, the E-index, and non-CEO director share ownership as factors that affect a firm’s governance structure.”