Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders*

By Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski, Yvette S. Harman, R. Parrino. Journal law and economy, 2006

110 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7ea164957ec6092214b17e74b8a995528abf563f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Peter G. Szilagyi
2. Ashwini Agrawal
3. Luc Renneboog
4. Caroline Flammer

In Finance

1. Peter G. Szilagyi
2. Ashwini Agrawal
3. Luc Renneboog

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, unknown): “de Bos and Donker (2004) investigate the incidence of voluntary accounting changes in Dutch firms between 1990 and 1998.”
• The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance (2011, background): “Borokhovich et al. (2006) analyze this latter result for takeover-related proposals, and find that the returns are only related positively to ownership by pressureinsensitive institutions.”
• Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (2012, background): “3 In particular, mutual funds and private pension funds have been found to be effective monitors of management (Brickley et al. 1988; Borokhovich et al. 2006; Agrawal and Mandelkar 1990; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007; Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998).”