Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring

By Harley E. Ryan, R. A. Wiggins. 2004

644 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bfa1e6f5e72f898a775638c981edaee84929c806

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Citations in the corpus

Co-opted Boards (2014, neutral): “It is likely that CEO power increases with tenure (e.g., see Weisbach 1988; Ryan and Wiggins 2004).”
Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, background): “…directors have incentives to maintain and enhance their reputation as effective monitors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and large firms offer greater opportunities for reputation building (Adams and Ferreira, 2008), higher visibility (Shivdasani, 1993) and higher compensation (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004).”
GETTING THEM TO THINK OUTSIDE THE CIRCLE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CEOS' EXTERNAL ADVICE NETWORKS, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE (2008, background): “…tends to strengthen the link between firm performance and elements of CEO compensation, such as CEOs’ annual bonuses, that are determined primarily by directors’ assessments of CEOs’ effectiveness (Ittner, Larcker, & Randall, 2003; Larcker, 1983; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004).”
Audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process (2010, positive): “Consistent with prior research (Ryan and Wiggins (2004)), our results indicate that directors serving on outsider dominated boards (high BdInd%) receive more compensation.”
The Impact of Firm Prestige on Executive Compensation (2017, background): “The literature argues that CEO duality weakens the ability of the board to monitor the CEO and leads to poor corporate governance (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004).”
Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy? (2014, background): “Relative ranking of directorships by compensation Since director compensation is correlated with firm size (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), it is possible that the variation in relative pay across an individual director’s board positions could create incentives to work harder at larger firms and hold onto ”